The Right of Privacy of Employees with Respect to Employer-Owned Computers and E-mails by Adams, Charles
University of Tulsa College of Law
TU Law Digital Commons
Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works
2004
The Right of Privacy of Employees with Respect to
Employer-Owned Computers and E-mails
Charles Adams
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/fac_pub
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles, Chapters in Books
and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
daniel-bell@utulsa.edu.
Recommended Citation
75 Okla. B. J. 2567 (2004).
& Employment
The Right of Privacy of Employees
With Respect to Employer-Owned
Computers and E-mails
By Charles W AdamsAn employee's right of privacy with respect to an employ-
er-owned computer or e-mail system can be summed up
by referring to the famous quotation from Scott McNealy:
"You have zero privacy anyway .... Get over it." Employers have
a number of justifications for obtaining access to computers as
well as for monitoring the use that employees make of the e-mail
systems and Internet access they are provided.
For one thing, the employers own the hard-
ware - both the computers and the servers the
computers are connected to. For another, the
employers are paying for the employee's time,
and therefore, they have a right to monitor
their employees to see whether they are actu-
ally working or not. Besides loafing on the job,
employees might be doing damage to the con-
pany: by bothering other employees, commit-
ting crimes, disclosing secrets to competitors
or exposing the company to liability for their
own offensive actions.
For a number of reasons, there have been no
reported cases where employers have been
found liable to employees for searching their
employees' computers or e-mail records. Nev-
ertheless, a potential for liability may exist if
the employer does not follow appropriate pro-
cedures to avoid violating an employee's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy or federal law.
The rights of employees to privacy with
respect to their computers and e-mails, and the
potential for employer liability for searching
employee computers and e-mail records are
discussed below.
LIABILITY BASED ON INVASION
OF PRIVACY
The potential for employer liability for inva-
sion of privacy is suggested by a case called K-
Mart Corporation v. Trotti.' The Trotti case arose
out of K-Mart's search of lockers that it had
supplied to employees at one of its stores to
store their personal items during working
hours. K-Mart also provided padlocks, but the
employees had the option of using their own
padlocks. Ms. Trotti stored her purse in a lock-
er when she arrived for work and used her
own combination lock. During her afternoon
break, she noticed her lock was hanging open,
and, although nothing was missing from either
the locker or her purse, the personal items in
her purse were in considerable disorder. The
store manager admitted that he had searched
the lockers that day, including Ms. Trotti's,
because one of the security personnel suspect-
ed that an unidentified employee had stolen a
watch. There was conflicting testimony on
whether the employees had been informed
previously that their lockers were subject to
being searched.
Vol. 75 - No. 28 - 10/2/2004 The Oklahoma Bar Journal 2567
Ms. Trotti sued K-Mart for
invasion of privacy, and the
jury returned a verdict of
$8,000 for mental anguish and
$100,000 in punitive damages.
The appellate court reversed
and ordered a new trial. It
decided that in order to recov-
er for invasion of privacy, a
person must show an intru-
sion that was highly offensive
to a reasonable person. Never-
theless, the appellate court
ruled that Ms. Trotti was enti-
tled to recover for invasion of
privacy, because there was
evidence that she satisfied this
requirement. Even though K-
Mart owned the locker it pro-
vided to Ms. Trotti, she had
"demonstrated a legitimate
expectation to a right of priva-
cy in both the locker itself and
those personal effects within
it" by placing her own lock on
it with K-Mart's consent.!
...even though the
employer had assured its
employees that e.mails
were confidential...
By analogy to the Trotti case, an employer
could potentially be liable for invasion of pri-
vacy, if it searched an employee's hard drive or
read e-mail messages that the employee had
sent or received, even though it owned the
employee's computer and the e-mail system. A
jury could find that the employee had "a legit-
imate expectation to a right to privacy" in the
hard drive and the e-mails, and that the
employer's intrusion was highly offensive to a
reasonable person, particularly if the employee
used a password on the computer and the e-
mails were encrypted. Nevertheless, no
employer has yet been found liable to an
employee for invasion of privacy on account of
reading e-mails or searching computer hard
drives.
In McLaren v. Microsoft Corp.,3 an ex-employ-
ee sued Microsoft for invasion of privacy. Mr.
McLaren alleged that Microsoft had broken
into some of the personal folders that were
maintained on his office computer and were
part of an application that Microsoft had creat-
ed to store e-mail messages. The e-mail system
was accessed through a network password,
and in addition, access to the personal folders
could be restricted by another password,
which Mr. McLaren had created for them.
The trial court dis-
missed the case, and the
appellate court affirmed.
It ruled that the case dif-
fered from the Trotti case,
because the locker in the
Trotti case was provided
so the employee could
store personal items,
while Microsoft provided
Mr. McLaren with a com-
puter for business purpos-
es. In addition, it decided
that Mr. McLaren did not
have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the e-
mail messages because
they were stored on the
office server, rather than
on Mr. McLaren's comput-
er. Moreover, the court
concluded that even if Mr.
McLaren did have a rea-
sonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the e-mail mes-
sages, Microsoft's intrusion would not be high-
ly offensive to a reasonable person, because
Mr. McLaren was at the time on suspension
pending an investigation of charges of sexual
harassment and "inventory questions," and he
had notified Microsoft that some of the e-mails
were relevant to the investigations. Thus, the
court determined that Microsoft's interests
outweighed any privacy interest Mr. McLaren
had with respect to the e-mails.
Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.4 arose out of an
employee's termination for making inappro-
priate and unprofessional comments over his
employer's e-mail system. The court decided
that the employee did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in e-mails he sent to his
supervisor, even though the employer had
assured its employees that e-mails were confi-
dential and that it would not use them against
employees as grounds for termination or repri-
mand. The court said that the employer's read-
ing of the employee's e-mails contrasted with a
urinalysis or personal property search, because
the employee was not compelled to disclose
any personal information about himself, but
instead sent the e-mails voluntarily over the
company's e-mail system. In addition, the
court determined that even if the employee did
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
e-mail messages, his privacy interest was out-
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weighed by the employer's interest in prevent-
ing inappropriate and unprofessional com-
ments and illegal activity over its e-mail sys-
tem.
Invasion of privacy claims were also rejected
by the courts in Muick v. Glenayre Electronics,5
TBG Insurance Services Corp. v. Superior Court,'
Kelleher v. City of Reading, and Garrity v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.' The employ-
er in the Muick case seized an employee's lap-
top computer from the employee's work area
at the request of federal law enforcement
authorities after they had arrested him for
charges of receiving and possessing child
pornography. The court decided that the
employee had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the laptop, because the employer
had an announced policy that it could inspect
the laptops it furnished to its employees.
Similarly, the court in the TBG Insurance Ser-
vices Corp. v. Superior Court case ruled that an
employee had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in a computer provided by his
employer, since the employee had signed a
policy statement that authorized his employer
to monitor files and messages on it. An
employer's e-mail policy also negated any
expectation of privacy in the Kelleher v. City of
Reading case. Finally, in the Garrity v. John Han-
cock Mutual Life Insurance Co. case, the court
found that the employees had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their e-mails at work
on account of the company's e-mail policy.
Moreover, even if the employees did have an
expectation of privacy, their privacy interests
were outweighed by the employer's legitimate
business interests in protecting its other
employees from harassment from the sexually
explicit e-mails that they were sending the
other employees.
Despite all these cases, it is still conceivable
that an employee
could succeed on .








employee's com- Sp1 Jcl cons
puter or reading
the employee's e- employee
mail, and the employer had given assurances
to its employees that the contents of their com-
puters and their e-mails were private and con-
fidential. An announced policy that computers
and e-mails are not private and confidential,
but instead are subject to monitoring by the
employer is recommended to negate any
expectation of privacy that employees would
claim. In addition, monitoring should only be
conducted for specific business purposes.
MONITORING BY GOVERNMENTAL
EMPLOYERS
Special considerations apply to the monitor-
ing of employees by governmental employers.
Unlike private employers, governmental
employers are subject to the prohibition in the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution against "unreasonable searches and
seizures." As a practical matter, however, the
limitations on monitoring computers and e-
mail systems by governmental employers are
the same as for private employers.
The United States Supreme Court addressed
the extent of privacy of government employees
under the Fourth Amendment in O'Connor v.
Ortega.' Dr. Ortega, a psychiatrist at a state hos-
pital claimed that the hospital administration
violated his rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment when it searched his office, including his
desk and file cabinets, while he was on admin-
istrative leave on account of an investigation of
various work-related charges against him. The
Supreme Court decided that the Fourth
Amendment protects the privacy of govern-
mental employees to the extent that they have
a reasonable expectation of privacy, and it
accepted the conclusion of the lower courts
that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his desk and file cabinets. The court
then went on to hold, though, that in contrast
to a search conducted by law enforcement
iderations apply to monitoring of
s by governmental employers.
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case was followed in United States v. Angevine,0
Leventhal v. Knapek," and United States v.
Simons.2 In the Angevine case, the court ruled
that a professor at Oklahoma State University
did not have a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy in his computer on account of a University
computer use and Internet policy It also ruled
that the professor did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to child
pornographic files that the police had recov-
ered through the use of special technology
after he had attempted to delete them from his
computer, because he no longer had access to
them. In the Leventhal case, the court decided
that an employee of a state agency did have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office
computer, but the state agency did not violate
his Fourth Amendment rights because the
agency had reasonable grounds for suspecting
the employee of work-related misconduct.
The Simons case involved both a remote
search of a Central Intelligence Agency
employee's computer for child pornography
and a seizure of the employee's hard drive
from his office. The court ruled that the
employee had no reasonable expectation of
privacy with respect to his Internet use
because of the CIA's Internet policy, but he did
have a reasonable expectation
of privacy with respect to the
hard drive in his office com-
puter. Nevertheless, the court
j ruled that the seizure of the
hard drive was reasonable,
because the CIA had a reason-
able basis for suspecting that
the hard drive would provide
evidence of work-related mis-
conduct on account of the
remote search of the employ-
ee 's computer that it hadA already conducted."
Although the Fourth)nable Amendment protects the pri-that the vacy of government employ-
ees, but not the privacy of pri-
vate employees with respect)rovide to searches by their employer,
there does not appear to any
related significant difference between
what governmental or private
employers can do in terms of
searching the computers or e-
mail records of their employ-
ees. In both cases, privacy is
protected only if there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, and the expectation of privacy
may be negated by a policy that computers
and e-mail are not private and confidential. In
addition, even if there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, the employee's interest in pri-
vacy may be outweighed by a government
employer's legitimate work-related interests,
such as investigating work-related misconduct
of the employee.
FEDERAL LAW RELATING TO
MONITORING OF EMPLOYEE E-MAILS
Another potential source of employer liabili-
ty for monitoring employee e-mails is a feder-
al law called the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (the "ECPA"). The federal wiretap-
ping statute4 originally prohibited the unau-
thorized interception of wire and oral commu-
nications in such a way that their contents
could be audibly overheard. "Intercept" was
originally defined in the federal wiretapping
statute as "the aural acquisition of the contents
of any wire or oral communications through
the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device."5 In 1986, the ECPA extended the fed-
eral wiretapping statute to cover any unautho-
rized interception of wire, oral or electronic
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communications. "Intercept" is now defined as
"the aural or other acquisition of the contents
of any wire, electronic, or oral communica-
tions through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device" (amendments
bolded) .16
In addition, the ECPA added a new chapter
that prohibited unlawful access to a wire or
electronic communication while it was in elec-
tronic storage. 7 Violations of the EPCA are
punishable by fine and imprisonment for up to
five years,18 and up to 10 years for subsequent
offenses. 9 The ECPA also authorizes persons
whose communications are intercepted or
unlawfully accessed while in electronic storage
to bring civil actions." Although these provi-
sions appear on their face to expose an
employer who monitored employee e-mails to
both criminal and civil liability, there are a
number of exceptions and defenses on which
an employer may rely to avoid liability.
A major limitation of the ECPA is that 18
U.S.C. § 2511 prohibits only the interception of
electronic communications. All the courts that
have considered the issue have agreed that "an
'intercept' under the ECPA must occur con-
temporaneously with the transmission."2' Gen-
erally, employer monitoring of employee e-
mails will not occur during the course of trans-
mission, but will instead be accomplished
through a later search of the employee e-mails
on either the employer's server or on the
employee's computer. Thus, it would be
unusual for employer monitoring of employee
e-mails to constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511.
Employer monitoring of employee e-mails
could potentially violate 18 U.S.C. § 2701, how-
ever, which imposes liability on anyone who:
(1) intentionally accesses without
authorization a facility through which an
electronic communication service is pro-
vided; or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authoriza-
tion to access that facility;
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents
authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic
storage in such system ....22
Whether an employer's reading of employee e-
mails violated § 2701 would turn on whether
the e-mails were in electronic storage. The term
"electronic storage" is defined in the EPCA as:
"(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a
wire or electronic communication incidental to
the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any
storage of such communication by an electron-
ic communication service for purposes of back-
up protection of such communication."I An e-
mail message is in "temporary, intermediate
storage ... incidental to the electronic transmis-
sion thereof" under paragraph (A), when it has
been received by the recipient's e-mail system,
but has not yet been read by the recipient. In
Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 4 the trial
court explained paragraph (A) by drawing an
analogy to a voice-mail system. When a voice-
mail is received, it is recorded in the recipient's
mailbox and stored until the recipient retrieves
the messages from the voice-mail system. At
this point, they are in "temporary, intermedi-
ate storage," for purposes of paragraph (A)
above. When the recipient retrieves the mes-
sages, the recipient may either delete them or
save them. Once the recipient opens and saves
e-mail messages, they are in "permanent stor-
age" for purposes of paragraph (B) above.'
Section 2701 expressly provides for an excep-
tion, though, if the unauthorized access was
"by the person or entity providing a wire or
electronic communications service." The court
relied on this exception in Fraser v. Nationwide
Mutual Ins. Co. 6 to find that an employer was
not liable under § 2701 for searching through
an employee's e-mails, because the e-mails
were stored on the employer's e-mail system,
which the employer administered. The Fraser
court cited to an earlier decision, Bohach v. City
of Reno," in which the City of Reno was found
not liable to two police officers for retrieving
text messages from an "Alphapage" message
system that were stored on the police depart-
ment's computer system. The Bohach court
decided that the City of Reno was within the
exception in 18 U.S.C. § 2701, because the
department was the provider of the message
system.
In addition, the ECPA has an express excep-
tion for employee consent to the interception
of electronic communications. Section
2511(2)(d) provides: "It shall not be unlawful ...
to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communi-
cation ... where one of the parties to the com-
munication has given prior consent to such
interception."2' Thus, either party to a tele-
phone or e-mail communication may record it
and share it with others, or consent to its mon-
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itoring by others. Consent to monitoring may
be either express or implied from the circum-
stances.
In Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co.," the court
emphasized that the scope of an employee's
consent to an employer's monitoring of tele-
phone calls may be limited. Ms. Watkins was
employed as a sales representative to solicit
advertising in the Yellow Pages. Her employer
had informed all of its employees of its policy
of monitoring their sales calls as part of its reg-
ular training program. The court ruled that
although Ms. Watkins had consented to the
monitoring of her sales calls, she had not con-
sented to the monitoring of her personal calls.
Her consent to the monitoring of sales calls
implicitly would cover an inadvertent inter-
ception of a personal call, but only for the time
that was needed to determine the nature of the
call. To the extent that an employer's intercep-
tion of a telephone call went beyond ascertain-
ing its nature, however, it was outside of the
employee's consent for purposes of the ECPA.
Similarly, the court ruled in Deal v. Spears" that
an employer's taping of telephone calls was
outside of the scope of the employee's consent.
Therefore, if an employer is going to rely on
the consent exception in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d),
the employer should make sure that the scope
of the employee's consent to monitoring is suf-
ficient to cover the monitoring that the
employer intends to do.
In summary, an employer will not be subject
to liability under § 2511 of the ECPA if it does
not monitor the e-mails while they are in the
course of being transmitted, and it will not be
subject to liability under § 2701 of the ECPA if
it is the provider of the e-mail communications
system. An employer may also avoid liability
under the ECPA for monitoring employee e-
mails by obtaining employee consent to the
monitoring that the employer intends to do.
CONCLUSION
Although there is a potential for employer
liability for searching employee computers
and e-mail records, employees face an uphill
battle on account of the various defenses
employers may have. An employee's expecta-
tion of privacy in an employer-provided com-
puter and e-mail records may be negated by an
announced company policy. Even in the
absence of a company policy regarding com-
puter and e-mail privacy, an employer will
probably not be liable to an employee for
searching an employer-provided computer or
e-mail records if it does so pursuant to a legiti-
mate business purpose. Thus, a company poli-
cy regarding computer and e-mail privacy
may not be absolutely necessary from a legal
standpoint. Nevertheless, having a company
policy is desirable, because it helps to avoid
misunderstandings by clarifying employer
and employee expectations, and therefore, it
likely would contribute to better employer-
employee relations.
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